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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure is one of the most complex areas of strategic financial decision 
making due to its interrelationship with other financial decision variables. For more than 
four decades discussion in corporate finance concerns the question of optimal capital 
structure: Given a level of total capital necessary for supporting firm’s activities, is there 
a way of dividing this capital into debt and equity which maximises firm value? And, if 
so, what are the critical factors in setting the leverage ratio for a given firm? Corporate 
finance literature is overwhelmed by this hot debate, which is still going on, about firm 
value triggered by the two conflicting conclusions of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). 
For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Harris and Raviv (1991). 
The theoretical and empirical research about the optimal capital structure has so 
far been inconclusive and conflicting. However, the capital structure approach to firm 
value has been successful to replace heuristics with more methodical approach to define 
capital structure of the firm. The researchers have theoretically as well as empirically 
identified many endogenous and exogenous factors affecting the firm’s leverage. They 
have theoretically and empirically identified agency costs, information asymmetry, taxes, 
non-debt tax shields, growth, firm size, assets’ collateral value and tangibility, 
profitability and liquidity, earnings variability, expected costs of financial distress, 
industry classification, country factor, and firm’s international activities as the 
determinants of firm’s debt-equity choices. 
The listed firms in Pakistan operate in public as well as private sector. Public 
sector is perceived to be inefficient in operating and investment decisions due to low 
managerial effort, a popular argument given in favour of privatisation. They were also 
believed to have privileged access to public sector dominated debt market. Based on 
perceived different management practices and environment we hypothesise that the firms 
in public sector may also have different determinants of debt-equity choices.  
This is an empirical study that covers private as well as public sector 
manufacturing firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. The data for this research has 
been adopted from ‘Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies Listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange’ and published by State Bank of Pakistan.  This data is based 
upon published accounts of the listed companies.    
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This study covers twenty nine years’ period, 1976-2004, to identify various 
determinants of financing choices of manufacturing firms listed on KSE and to see if type 
of ownership, i.e. private sector or public sector, has an impact on these decisions. There 
is no other comprehensive data source that may provide firm level financial data in a 
standardised format over a longer time frame. The limitation of this study is that some of 
the determinants found in literature may not be calculable from the available data.   
2.  ANALYSIS 
It is a common practice in social sciences that the experts are using proxies and 
dummies for their empirical analysis. The same can be observed in the different studies for the 
leverage. However, three proxies for leverage are used in different empirical studies. For 
example, Gaver and Gaver (1993) have used Debt/Equity Ratio (Long-term 
Liabilities/Common Equity), Remmers, et al. (1974), and Rahman (1990) have used 
Debt/Total Assets Ratio (Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets), and Bradley, et al. (1984) and 
Wald (1999) have used Total Debt/Total Assets Ratio [(Short-term Liabilities + Long-term 
Liabilities)/Total Assets] as a proxy for capital structure respectively. In most of the empirical 
literature these proxies or their combinations are often used for leverage. Various studies have 
used book and/or market value of debt and equity to calculate these proxies. However, the 
listed firms included in this database did not raise debt from market in dominant majority of 
the cases. Therefore, the book values are the only relevant values.  Moreover, the market 
values for equity are not available in this data base. Owing to the data limitation only the book 
values for equity will be used wherever needed. No bias because of this misspecification is 
expected as observed by Titman and Wessels (1988). 
For testing the hypotheses, a number of equations for the three proxies of leverage, 
with and without log, linear and non-linear, are estimated. However, the results of 
estimated equations indicate that TL/TA is the best proxy for leverage. The main reason 
for this phenomenon may be that the firms in Pakistan are generally observed to use 
current liabilities as their regular source for all types of their financing needs. The 
structure of capital market in Pakistan suggests that TL/TA (proportion of total assets 
being financed through total liabilities) would better reflect the picture of leverage. Table 
1 narrates the proxies of all the variables included in this study.   
Table 1 
Variables and Their Proxies 
Variable Proxy Definition 
Leverage TL/TA Ratio (Long-term Liabilities + Short-term 
Liabilities)/Total Assets 
Agency Costs Expense Ratio 
Assets’ Utilisation Ratio 
Operating Expenses/Sales 
Sales/Total Assets 
Taxes Tax Rate Tax Provision/Net Profit Before Taxes 
Non-debt Tax Shield Depreciation Rate Depreciation for the Year/Total Assets 
Growth Sales Growth Rate (Sales 1 – Sales 0)/Sales 0 
Firm Size Ln (Total Assets) Ln (Total Assets) 
Assets’ Collateral Value Gross Fixed Assets’ Ratio Fixed Assets’ at Cost/Total Assets 
Assets’ Tangibility Net Fixed Assets’ Ratio Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets 
Profitability Net Income Ratio Net Income/Total Assets 
Liquidity Current Ratio Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
Earnings Variability Changes in Net Profit before 
Taxes 
{(NPBT1 - NPBT0)/NPBT0}/TA1 
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2.1.  Agency Costs 
High expense rates and low asset turnover can result from excessive perquisites 
and inefficiency in operating and investment decisions due to low managerial effort 
resulting into managerial agency costs. The literature has considered such agency costs 
and observed that debt restrains agency costs [Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Thies and 
Klock (1992)]. Moreover, managers can readily hide their perks consumption in 
operating expenses, while assets purchased for managerial consumption purposes will 
tend to reduce asset turnover [Ang, et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003)]. This study 
uses expense ratio being the direct proxy and asset turnover being an inverse measure of 
agency costs due to poor investment decisions and insufficient effort by management 
which result in lower sales or large amount of assets with low productivity purchased by 
the management for excessive perk consumption. 
The managements of public sector are perceived to be relatively inefficient, the 
argument generally advanced for privatisation of such firms. Based on this, it is our 
hypothesis that higher agency costs may prevail in public sector as compared to private 
sector. However, the mean expense ratio (expenses/sales) is 11 percent for public sector 
and 34 percent for private sector negates the common perception of inefficiency to show 
that public sector has been relatively operationally efficient.  While, public sector has 
been relatively inefficient in its investment decisions with a mean assets’ utilisation ratio 
(sale/total assets) of 1.13 as compared to 1.38 of private sector, in line with common 
perception. Moreover, to observe impact of agency costs on leverage regressions were 
run and regression results of the leverage with these two proxies of agency costs are 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Correlation of Agency Costs with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with 
TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Expense Ratio Operating Expenses/Sales
 
–0.19 –0.73 
Assets Utilisation Ratio Sale/Total Assets –0.27 0.75 
The Table 2 indicates that the increase in operations related agency costs of public 
sector firms due to increased management inefficiency in operating decisions (increased 
expenses) decreases leverage. This finding is in line with corporate finance literature that 
agency costs are inversely related with leverage. However, management inefficiency in 
investment decisions due to poor utilisation of assets or non-business assets i.e. that may 
not be used to generate sales like luxury vehicles, office furniture etc. increases leverage 
of public sector firms. It is probably possible due to their privileged access to financing 
sources and lesser accountability of their managerial performance. Such a myopic 
approach to raise debt for non-business assets may entangle these firms in ‘debt trap’. 
Conversely, the private sector shows a strong conformity to the observations found in 
literature that agency costs are inversely related to leverage or increased operational and 
investment efficiency decreases reliance on debt. 
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2.2.  Taxes 
Researchers have been discussing the question, “Do the tax benefits of debt affect 
corporate financing decisions?” Modigliani and Miller (1963), Scholes and Wolfson 
(1992), Schulman, et al. (1996) and many others have presented theoretical as well as 
empirical arguments that the tax benefits of debt lead the firms to issue more debt so as to 
maximise the firm value. However, Miller (1977), Chen and Kim (1979), and Fama and 
French (1998) found no evidence in support of tax benefit of debt. Some of the 
researchers like Barclay and Smith (1995) and Graham (2000) found a mixed support of 
the tax benefit of debt. 
We will try to answer this question with a little modification, “Do the tax 
benefits of debt affect corporate financing decisions differently in public and private 
sectors?” Public sectors firms have got favourable tax treatment during the period 
under study with the mean tax rate (taxes/net profit before taxes) of 34 percent as 
compared to 53 percent of private sector. However, contrary to the findings of the 
literature the Table 3 depicts that the public sector shows a mild inverse response to 
decrease leverage if tax rate is increased. This could be explained by the privileged 
tax treatment they get. On the other hand, private sector tends to increase their 
leverage with the increase in taxes. This finding is in line with the observations 
found in literature; see for example Modigliani and Miller (1963), MacKie-Mason 
(1996), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Givoly, et al. (1992), Barclay and Smith (1995) 
and Walsh and Ryan (1997).   
Table 3 
Relationship of Taxes with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Tax Rate Taxes/Net Profit Before Taxes
 
–0.05 0.23 
2.3.  Non-debt Tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shield Non-debt tax shield may affect financing policy of the firms. 
Theoretical models like trade-off [e.g. Scott (1972), and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)] 
and observations by researchers [e.g. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983), Shenoy and Koch 
(1996)] suggest that there exists substitutability between non-debt and debt tax shields. 
They observe that the firms with more depreciation allowances may not enjoy the full tax 
benefits from leverage. The non-debt tax shields may eliminate the need for debt-
generated tax shields and such firms may therefore tend to have lower leverage. 
However, Bradley, et al. (1984) have found a significant positive association between 
debt and the non-debt tax shields.  
The Table 4 indicates that public sector seems to take more advantage of internally 
generated cash flow by depreciation to reduce its leverage. Such a behaviour is in 
conformity with the trade-off model i.e. the depreciation substitutes the debt tax shield. 
The private sector, however, nominally reduces leverage in response to increase in non-
debt tax shield.  
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Table 4 
Relationship of Non-debt Tax Shield with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Depreciation Rate Depreciation/Total Assets –0.52 –0.03 
 
2.4.  Growth 
Toy, et al. (1974), Stonehill, et al. (1975), and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) 
have presented evidence to support the view that growth rate is a determinant of capital 
structure. Gupta (1969) and Higgins (1977) have shown that the firms having more 
investment opportunities use more debt to maximise the firm’s value. While, others found 
inverse of this, see for example, Myers (1977), Anderson and Makhija  (1999), Lang, et 
al. (1996), and Barclay and Smith (1995). 
The firm’s growth rate is a determinant of capital structure [Toy, et al. (1974), 
Stonehill, et al. (1975)]. The results of estimated equations for both the sectors, depicted 
in Table 5, indicate that growth has positive impact on the debt level with public sector 
responding more strongly. Privileged access to the debt sources, as explained in section 
2.1, may be a valid reason for this phenomenon. Moreover, this sector may be growing 
faster than internally sustainable and the retained earnings might not be sufficient to 
finance their growth needs. While choosing external financing sources, external equity is 
generally last resort for such firms as it dilutes earnings leading them to choose debt. 
Similar observations are made by Gupta (1969), Higgins (1977) and Ellsworth (1983).   
Table 5 
Relationship of Growth with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Sales Growth Rate (Sales 1 – Sales 0)/Sales0 0.21 0.12 
2.5.  Firm Size 
A number of studies have suggested that the leverage ratios might be, directly or 
inversely, associated with the firm size, for example, Archer and Faerber (1966), Gupta 
(1969), Scott and Martin (1975), Titman and Wesels (1988), and Anderson and Makhija 
(1999). The estimations for the present study, presented in Table 6, also suggest that firm 
size is inversely associated leverage for both the sectors. Larger firms may have better 
access to equity market, or may have low transaction costs, or may wish to avoid 
restrictive covenants of debt to maintain their managerial flexibility.  
Table 6 
Relationship of Growth with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Ln(Total Assets) Ln(Total Assets) –0.46 –0.77 
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2.6.  Collateral Value of Assets and Tangibility 
The firms with assets that could be used as collateral may be expected to issue 
more debt to take advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, higher fraction of tangible 
assets in assets base of a firm makes the debt choice more likely [Myers and Majluf 
(1984), MacKie-Mason (1990)]. Walsh and Ryan (1997) observe that the firm’s debt is 
an increasing function of its tangible assets. If the firms do not have assets to be 
collateralised the creditors may impose stringent conditions leading the firms to opt for 
equity [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984)]. However, contrary to the 
noted literature, both the assets’ collateral value as well as their tangibility has a negative 
association with the leverage of public as well as private sector firms in Pakistan, as 
depicted in Table 7.   
Table 7 
Relationship of Collateral Value of Assets and Tangibility with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Gross Fixed Assets’ 
Ratio 
Fixed Assets’ at 
Cost/Total Assets –0.65 –0.25 
Net Fixed Assets’ 
Ratio 
Net Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets –0.21 –0.72 
 
The above results suggest that the firms with higher collateral value and higher 
level of tangible assets prefer equity over debt in their capital structure choices. A 
possible explanation could be that in Pakistani credit market the firms might have 
some other tools/securities/collaterals/options other than collateral value of their 
assets to be able to access the credit market to get debt for the firm. Moreover, it is 
felt that these firms take tangible assets as their productive base for revenue 
generation that may enable them to have better returns, more non-debt tax shields- 
the depreciation, and possibly improved operational cash flows. Better returns and 
cash flows may have been used to expand if they have rich perceived investment 
opportunity sets. However, if they use these for debt reduction this indicates that 
these firms have limited growth options.   
2.7.  Profitability, Cash Flows, and Liquidity 
Profitable and liquid firms could absorb more debt [Brennan and Schwartz 
(1984)]. Ross (1977) and Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest that higher leverage 
should be associated with higher cash flow in the same period. Such an explanation is 
labeled as ‘Signaling Theory of Capital Structure’. On the other hand, Opler and 
Titman (1994) observe “A number of authors have noted that the negative correlation 
between profits and leverage is consistent with Donaldson’s (1961) POT”. Similarly, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Baskin (1989) suggest that profitable and liquid 
firms prefer internally generated funds.  
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Table 8 
Relationship of Profitability, Cash Flows, and Liquidity with Leverage 
Correlation Coefficient with TL/TA 
Proxy Ratio Public Private 
Net Profit Ratio NPBT/Sales –0.48 –0.38 
Cash Flow Ratio Net Cash Flow/Sales –0.23 –0.56 
Current Ratio Current Ratio/Current 
Liabilities –0.09 –0.29 
 
The results shown in Table 8 suggest that the profitability (NPBT/Sales) has 
significant inverse association with debt level in both the sectors that can be explained in 
the light of POT of Donaldson (1962) and observations of Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Baskin (1989) and Opler and Titman (1994) that profitable firms prefer internal funds for 
their investment needs.  
Liquidity (Current Assets/Current Liabilities) has negative association with the 
debt level of firms in both the sectors. The probable explanation is ‘Pecking Order’ of 
firm’s financing choices, i.e. the liquid firms prefer internal equity and lesser debt 
[Titman and Wessels (1988), Myers (1993)]. Also the firms may have more growth 
options in their investment opportunity sets in future. Myers (1977), Barclay and Smith 
(1995), Lang, et al. (1996) and Anderson and Makhija (1999) observe that such firms 
prefer lesser debt.   
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The public sector firms have a different governance structure when compared to 
that of private sector. Moreover, public sector may have privileged access to financing 
sources, have got favourable tax treatment during the period under study as against the 
private sector and may have lesser accountability. Public sector seems to be preferring 
debt due to its different governance structure and privileged position they enjoy vis-à-vis 
their counterparts in private sector. Inefficiencies coupled with high leverage may 
entangle these firms in ‘debt trap’.    
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